




When we normatively assess actions we hold them to certain standards. When performing moral 
assessments, we judge whether actions are right or wrong. If an action is part of a practice, such 
as that of playing tennis, we judge whether the action conforms to the rules which govern that 
practice. This is also true of our assessments of assertions, or acts of testimony. We judge such 
acts in terms of truth or falsity, and in terms of conformity to the norm of assertion.  
However, our normative assessments go beyond mere judgements of norm conformity. We also 
assess actions in relation to the agents who perform them. For example, our moral assessments 
go beyond judgements of right and wrong. We also assess the agent’s credit or responsibility for 
doing the right or wrong thing. These judgements come in different forms. Gary Watson (1996) 
draws our attention to a particularly important distinction; that between responsibility as 
attributability, and responsibility as accountability. The former is a type of aretaic assessment. 
When we judge an agent to be responsible in this sense we take their action to be a manifestation 
of their character: roughly, their web of motivations, values, and commitments. Judgements of 
accountability go further, concerning what the agent owes to their moral community, and the 
reactive attitudes their actions warrant. 
Watson’s distinction can be extended beyond moral appraisal to normative appraisal more 
generally. In particular, his distinction applies to our assessments of testifiers, and acts of 
testimony. It is commonly observed that, when testifying, speakers take responsibility for what 
they assert. They make themselves accountable for having spoken the truth. And they open 
themselves up to negative reactive attitudes if they state falsehoods.1 However, there is also an 
aretaic dimension to our assessments of assertions. We can judge assertions in terms of the 
character the testifier displays by making their assertion. 
In this paper I will argue that such aretaic assessments are central to our practice of appraising 
acts of testimony. I will argue that aretaic assessment is central both to our negative appraisals; 
the judgement that an agent has lied, and to our positive appraisals; our acceptance of testimony. 
To put this aim another way: I will introduce the notion of ‘testimonial worth’, which is a 
reflection of the quality of character a speaker displays in asserting. And I will illustrate the 
interest and power of the notion by showing that it helps us solve recalcitrant problems in two 
separate areas: the analysis of lying, and the nature of testimony.  
§1 contains a more general discussion of aretaic assessment, and introduces the notion of 
testimonial worth. In §2 I argue that an agent lies only if they display poor testimonial worth. 
And in §3 I argue that taking a speaker at their word, as opposed to treating them as a mere 
                                                          
1 Some epistemologists have made a great deal of this fact. In particular, assurance theorists of testimony emphasize 
the second personal quality of testimonial responsibility (see, for example Ross (1986), Hinchman (2005, 2014), 
Moran (2005)).  
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indicator of the truth, involves taking their truthfulness to be a manifestation of their character as 
a testifier.  
1. Moral and Testimonial Worth 
1.1. Moral Worth 
Sometimes we do wrong without bearing any responsibility for our having done so. Imagine that 
we are standing in a crowded train carriage, and the train jolts. I step forward to regain my 
balance and, without realizing it, I step on your foot.2 In doing so I have infringed on your 
person, and done you wrong. However, this wrongdoing does not reflect negatively on me as an 
agent. If, on the other hand, I intentionally stepped on your foot, perhaps with the aim of causing 
you discomfort, this would reflect poorly on me. There is an important sense in which I am, in 
the latter case but not the former, responsible for wronging you. In the latter case, but not the 
former, my action of stepping on your foot reflects poorly on me as a moral agent. My wronging 
you is a manifestation of my moral character. 
Likewise, an agent can do the right thing without this reflecting positively on them. Take, for 
instance, Kant’s shopkeeper (cf. Kant 1785 [1998], 4: 397-398): A shopkeeper who gives the 
correct change does the right thing. However, if they do so only because this is good for business 
then they do not display positive moral worth. Their giving the correct change, despite this being 
the right thing to do, does not reflect positively on them as a moral agent. By contrast a 
shopkeeper who gives the correct change because they know that it is the right thing to do 
displays positive moral worth. Their doing the right thing manifests their moral character.  
I will call such aretaic assessments, both positive and negative, judgements of moral worth. I will 
not say much about the conditions which must be satisfied for an agent to display positive or 
negative moral worth, as my aim here is simply to draw an analogy between judgements of moral 
worth, and our appraisals of testimony. However, the notion of moral worth I am employing 
does require clarification along several dimensions.3  
Firstly, it is important to clarify what I mean by “moral character”. I take moral character to be, 
roughly, the agent’s nexus of values, desires, principles, and commitments. That is, it is a function 
of the states of the agent which underlie and explain their free choices, and actions. I take it that a 
                                                          
2 Importantly, my act of stepping forward is intentional and under my control (otherwise it is not clear that I would 
have wronged you in any sense). I simply do not conceive of the action, as I perform it, as an act of stepping on your 
foot.  
3 The notion I am employing is slightly different to the notion or ‘moral worth’ discussed recently by, for example,  
Arpaly (2002), Markovits (2010), Sliwa (2016), and Way (2017). For these theorists, positive moral worth is a feature 
of morally good actions.  As I conceive of it, an agent can display positive moral worth even when doing the wrong 
thing (for example, if an agent does the wrong thing despite acting for the right reasons).  Nonetheless, the notions 
of moral worth employed here and in this literature are, at the very least, close relatives. An agent displays positive 
moral worth, in my sense, when the moral character underlying their action is such that an agent’s doing the right 
thing could be a manifestation of this character. The existing literature on moral worth can be seen as a debate 
regarding when the rightness of an action does manifest the agent’s moral character. The notion I am employing is 
closer to that employed by Greco (1995, 2006), and Hartman (2017).  
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wrongful act can either manifest, or fail to manifest the agent’s moral character. For example, if 
an agent explicitly disregards a concern for the good, and this fact partially explains why they 
perform some wrongful act, then their wrongful act will manifest their moral character. Likewise, 
if an agent is committed to doing the right thing, knows the right thing to do, and does the right 
thing as a result, then their doing the right thing manifests their moral character. I take an agent 
to display negative moral worth when the moral character underlying their action is such that it 
could be manifested by the performance of a wrongdoing (in which case they would be 
responsible in the aretaic sense for said wrongdoing). And I take an agent to display positive 
moral worth if the moral character underlying their action could be manifested by their doing the 
right thing. 
Importantly, an agent may display poor moral worth without directly bringing about any harm (or 
otherwise directly violating any moral law). What matters is that the character underlying their 
action is such that it could (at least in relevantly similar cases) be manifested by such wrongdoing.4 
This is brought out by cases of moral luck (as observed by Greco (1995, 2006) and Hartman 
(2017)). Suppose Sam has consumed too much alcohol, and has decided to take his new car for a 
spin. He speeds through a residential neighbourhood and, as he screeches around a corner, he 
hits a small child. Sam has done wrong, and his wrongdoing manifests his moral character. 
Compare Sam to Bam: Bam is in exactly Sam’s position, he has also drunk far too much, and is 
speeding around a residential neighbourhood. Luckily for Bam the children playing nearby don’t 
end up running into the road. So he makes it home safely. We would generally respond 
differently to Sam and Bam. The sanctions their actions give rise to differ. And, on one level, this 
makes sense. Sam has done something that Bam has not: he has killed a child. This wrongdoing is 
on his moral record, and it is not on Bam’s.5 
However, there is an element of discomfort in treating Sam and Bam differently. After all, it is 
merely a matter of luck that Sam, and not Bam, killed a child. And it seems mistaken to hold that 
an agent should be subject to sanctions merely through bad luck. I do not wish to take a stand on 
whether or not there is a genuine problem here. I do think it is clear, however, that moral worth 
provides a dimension along which we can assess each agent symmetrically. Each agent, displays 
the same moral worth in each case. The same network of values, motivations, desires, and 
principles underlies their actions. Bam is lucky not to hit a child. However, the moral character he 
displays is such that the killing of a child could manifest this moral character. It is precisely 
because of this that his act displays poor moral worth (in the sense intended here). 
Finally, it is important to note that the moral worth an agent displays in performing a particular 
action needn’t be a reflection of their overall moral character, where this is conceived of as 
somewhat stable over time. Rather, when assessing an action in terms of moral worth we are 
assessing it in light of the agent’s moral character in the situation in question: the values, 
                                                          
4 It is at this point where my notion or moral worth departs, in the way noted in footnote three, from the standard 
notion. 
5 There is a clear sense in which Bam has done wrong. He has behaved recklessly, and put children at risk. However, 
his behaviour constitutes a wrong in a less direct sense. It is wrong precisely because it could easily have resulted in 
the death of a child, and child killing is wrong.  
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principles, and commitments which are operative in the context of action. Consider, for example, 
an SS officer who momentarily comes to his moral senses and, at great risk to himself, attempts 
to rescue a Jewish family. We might judge that, regardless of the outcome of his attempt, the 
officer displays great moral worth. Nonetheless, if such behaviour genuinely constitutes a 
departure from the norm, his overall moral character (thought of as a reflection of his stable 
moral character over time) may be very poor indeed. 
Normal human beings have a mess of motivations, values, and commitments. Certain features of 
an agent’s character may lay dormant most of the time, only being brought out in certain 
situations. Even morally praiseworthy individuals may have a darker side to their character, which 
only reveals itself on occasion. When that side of their character is brought out, and leads them 
to act immorally, they will display poor moral worth, as their immoral action will manifest a 
negative aspect of their character which usually lays dormant. Yet, they will still be praiseworthy 
overall if the positive side of their character (for example, their commitment to moral duty) is 
normally dominant. For a particular trait to be dominant during a duration of time it is not 
required for it to be dominant during all sub intervals of that duration. In light of this, we can 
assess the moral character an agent displays over arbitrary periods of time. We may judge an 
agent to display positive moral worth over the duration t1-t100, take them to display poor moral 
worth over a sub-interval of that duration (say, t10-t20), and display exemplary moral worth over a 
sub-sub-interval (say, t15-t16). I will refer to the character an agent’s actions exemplify in a 
particular situation as the agent’s “situational character”.  
1.2. Testimonial Worth 
Just as our moral successes and failures can manifest our worth as moral agents, our successes 
and failures in other realms can manifest our worth along other dimensions of assessment. 
Watson gives the following example:  
My halfhearted effort on the tennis court would not support a negative evaluation of my 
proficiencies at that sport. Nevertheless, it might bear negatively on me as a tennis player. 
One can be "good at" playing tennis without being overall a good tennis player. A good 
tennis player, overall, possesses not only a high level of skill but, among other things, a 
commitment to the game, a responsibility to its distinctive demands. (In this way, 'good 
tennis player' functions rather like 'good human being'). 
Watson, 1996, 244.  
Just as an agent’s wrongful actions can manifest their poor moral character, an agent’s failings at 
tennis may manifest their poor character as a tennis player. That is, their loss of the tennis match 
may result from their laziness and lack of commitment to the game. Likewise, a testifier’s failure 
to speak the truth may manifest their poor character as a testifier. When we assess a speaker’s 
testimonial worth we do not merely assess the truth or falsity of their assertion. Rather, we assess 
their situational character as a testifier, as exemplified by their assertion. An agent’s testimonial 
character will be a function of, for example, their commitment to truthfulness, their 
responsiveness to the norms governing communication, their responsibility as a belief former, 
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and potentially innumerable other commitments, values, and principles capable of influencing 
their reliability as testifiers.6 An agent displays poor testimonial worth when the situational 
testimonial character underlying their assertion is such that the falsity of an utterance could 
manifest this character. This is simply to say that there are cases in which exactly the same 
testimonial character is displayed in which they speak falsely, and their doing so is a manifestation 
of their character. This is what it means for an assertion to display poor testimonial worth.7 
In getting clear on this, it will be useful to return to the analogy with Sam and Bam. Although 
Bam did not hit a child, and thus did not violate the moral norm forbidding the killing of 
innocent children, he did display poor moral worth, since the character underlying his action was 
such that it could have been manifested in the killing of an innocent child (a major violation of 
the moral norms). Arguably, asserting falsehoods does not always involve the violation of moral 
norms. However, it does always involve the violation of communicative norms. Just as Bam luckily 
failed to violate the norm against killing innocent children, despite the character he displayed at 
the time, a speaker may luckily fail to violate the norm against asserting falsehoods, despite the 
character they display when asserting.  
For example, consider Samantha and Bamantha, the bullshitting sisters of Sam and Bam. 
Samantha wants her neighbour to believe that her brother, Sam, has never been in a car accident. 
She has no reason to believe this, and she doesn’t particularly care if it is true. She just wants her 
neighbour to believe it. So she tells her neighbour ‘Sam has never been in a car accident’. As it 
turns out, this is false. Sam has been in a car accident. He hit a child whilst drink driving. Thus, 
Samantha has violated the communicative norm against asserting falsehoods. Moreover, her 
doing so was a manifestation of the character underlying her utterance; in this case, her disregard 
for the truth. Now consider Bamantha. Bamantha, wants to convince her neighbour that her 
brother, Bam, has never been in a car accident. She has no reason to believe this, and she doesn’t 
particularly care if it is true. She just wants her neighbour to believe it. So she asserts ‘Bam has 
never been in a car accident’. As it happens, this is true. Bam has never been in a car accident. 
Thus, Bamantha, unlike Samantha, has not violated the communicative norm against asserting 
falsehoods.8 However, just as there is  pressure to treat Sam and Bam equally as moral agents, 
there is pressure to treat Samantha and Bamantha equally as testifiers. Despite the fact that 
Samantha spoke falsely, and Bamantha spoke the truth, the character their communicative actions 
displayed was parallel. They each displayed the same testimonial worth.  
It is important to note that an agent might display exemplary testimonial worth despite asserting 
something false. For example, they may have extremely good reason believe what they assert, and 
                                                          
6 Different agents may exhibit exemplary testimonial character whilst differing with respect to such factors. An 
excess of, for example, evidence responsiveness may make up for a lack of commitment to the truth (Jennifer 
Lackey’s creationist teacher, discussed in §2.2 and §3, would be an example of such an agent (see Lackey 2007)).  
7 It is important to note that the relevant counterpart assertions needn’t have the same content as the actual 
assertion. If content identity was necessary then it would be impossible to lie by asserting a necessary truth, as there 
are no situations where one asserts falsely by asserting such a proposition. 
8 Which is not to say that she has violated no communicative norms. Just as Bam no doubt violates norms against 
carelessness, Bamantha no doubt violates parallel norms (perhaps the knowledge norm of assertion, if there is such a 
norm). 
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they may be disposed not to assert without such reasons. Still, it may turn out that, by an 
unforeseeable stroke of bad luck, they end up being mistaken. Likewise, an agent might display 
poor testimonial worth despite speaking the truth. More generally, not all factors which affect a 
speaker’s reliability will affect their testimonial character. An unlucky speaker who consistently 
forms false beliefs despite being a responsible belief former will, even if sincere, be a highly 
unreliable testifier. Still, it would be wrong to say that such an agent displays poor character as a 
testifier. They are unreliable despite their character, not because of it. Likewise, we could imagine 
an agent who consistently offers reliable testimony despite their intention to do the opposite, as 
they reliably form false beliefs. Such an agent, despite being reliable, would be displaying poor 
testimonial character. Their reliability is an accident. They are reliable despite displaying poor 
testimonial character. 
This is entirely consistent with the fact that luck plays an important role in the development and 
constitution of character. One’s having developed exemplary character as a testifier might be the 
result of external circumstances largely beyond one’s control. One might, thus, be lucky to have 
exemplary character as a testifier. If one is then rendered unreliable as a testifier by, through no 
fault of one’s own, acquiring a great deal of misleading evidence, this will not automatically alter 
one’s character as a testifier. As long as one’s commitments, values, and dispositions remain in 
line with those developed before the string of bad luck, one’s character will remain invariant.9  
This concludes my outline of the notion of testimonial worth. In the following sections I will 
argue that judgements of testimonial worth play a central role in the judgement that a speaker has 
lied, and in our acceptance of testimony.  
2. Lies and Testimonial Worth. 
2.1 Shifty Judgements 
To label an assertion a lie is to use one of the most damning assessments of speech that we have 
at our disposal. Such judgements play a central role in our practice of appraising testifiers and acts 
of testimony. In this section I argue that, in order to lie, an agent must display poor testimonial 
worth. 
The standard philosophical definition of lying holds that the following conditions are necessary 
and sufficient for one to have lied: 
1. One asserts some proposition p.  
2. One believes that p is false.  
                                                          
9 This can be seen clearly via an analogy with skill. Consider a skilled archer. It is likely that luck will have played a 
large role in the acquisition of their status. For example, they might only have reached this status as a result of being 
blessed with a good work ethic, having had a competent teacher, having had access to an archery range, and even 
having hit many lucky shots from which they were able to learn things. Now imagine that this archer is subject to a 
long run of bad luck. Whenever they take a shot a freak gust of wind blows their arrow off target. Such an archer 
ceases to be reliable at hitting the target. However, they don’t thereby cease to be a skilled archer. I see character as 
analogous to skill in this sense.  
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3. One intends to deceive one’s audience by asserting p. 
Each condition is controversial when considered as necessary for lying.10 However, it is 
standardly assumed that these conditions are at least jointly sufficient for an agent to have lied.11 
If this is all that is required in order for one to have lied, then a case in which a speaker clearly 
satisfies these criteria should yield a clear and uncontroversial judgement that the speaker has lied 
(assuming, of course, that to judge an agent to have lied is simply to judge that conditions 
sufficient for them to have lied have been satisfied). However, there are cases which satisfy these 
criteria in which it is not clear that the speaker has lied. Consider the following:  
PARTY: Max is talking with an acquaintance, Sally, about where they will be in the 
evening. Sally is going to an art exhibit and a fancy restaurant. Max was planning to stay at 
home and read a book. However, he does not want to tell Sally this, as she may think less 
of him. Aware that Tom, a mutual acquaintance, is holding a party that night, Max says “I 
will be at Tom’s party”. At the time of his assertion he does not intend to actually attend 
the party, he merely wishes to deceive Sally into believing he will be at the party. 
Moreover, he is aware of this.  
At this point, according to the standard view, it is settled that Max has lied. He asserted a 
proposition; that he will be at the party. He believes this proposition is false. And he asserted it 
with the intent to deceive. This is not a counterintuitive result. From these details alone it seems 
quite natural to say that Max has lied. However, the situation may evolve in different ways, and 
attention to Max’s subsequent behaviour can put pressure on us to revise our initial verdict. Let 
us consider some ways in which the scenario may evolve:  
SIMPLE LIE: After telling Sally that he will be at the party Max goes home and settles in 
for a night of reading. He reads through the night, never attending the party.  
In this case it is clear that Max has lied, just as the standard view predicts. However, the case 
could evolve differently:  
CHANGE OF MIND: In general Max is a highly trustworthy and morally upstanding 
person. Deception is out of character for him. Thus, upon telling Sally that he will be at 
the party he feels terrible. He likes and respects Sally, and is disturbed by the idea of 
misleading her. Moreover, having said that he would be at the party he now feels a 
commitment to be there. That is, having committed himself to the claim that he will be at 
the party he now feels an obligation to make this claim true. Thus, upon asserting that he 
                                                          
10 There is disagreement as to the relevant notion of assertion (Carson (2006), Fallis (2009), Saul (2012), and Stokke 
(2013, 2016)). Some theorists deny that the speaker must disbelieve the proposition they assert (Marsili (2014),  
Krauss (2017), and Pepp (2018)). And many theorists now reject the third condition due to the existence of bald 
faced lies; lies where it is common knowledge that what the speaker says is false (Carson (2006), Sorensen (2007), 
Fallis (2009, 2013), Saul (2012), and Stokke (2013)). Bald faced lies will be discussed in §2.2 
11  There are exceptions to this generalization. Some theorists hold that lies must be false (Carson (2006, 2009, 2010), 
Turri and Turri (2015)), or even known to be false (Benton (2018)). But these theorists are in the minority. I will 
discuss this position shortly. For arguments that lies needn’t be false see Mannison (1969), Saul (2012), and 
Wiegmann, Samland, and Waldmann (2016).  
8 
will be at the party he immediately changes his mind and resolves to attend the party after 
all. He follows through on this intention, and attends the party.  
CHANGE OF MIND can evoke conflicting verdicts.12 On the one hand, if we focus our 
attention on Max as he produces his assertion, and think about what he is doing at that very 
moment, he seems to be lying. On the other hand, if we view the case retrospectively, assessing 
Max’s assertion in the context of his broader pattern of behaviour, then it is far from clear that he 
has lied. Indeed, it is easy to feel the opposite: that, in the end, he has not lied. After all, it might 
be thought, it is in large part due to his commitment to honesty and truthfulness (despite his 
temporary blip) that what he asserted ended up being true. If someone asserts a truth, and their 
having done so is explained by their deep commitment to truthfulness, it can naturally seem a 
stretch to claim that they lied; to apply our most damning assessment of truthfulness to their 
utterance.13 Yet, if the standard view is correct then judgements about this case should be clear. 
After all, it is clear that the conditions set out by the standard view are satisfied. 
To be clear, there is an obvious sense in which Max is momentarily dishonest and misleading. He 
had a deceptive intention, and he misleads Sally by falsely communicating an intention which he 
lacked. However, this is not sufficient to make his utterance a lie. He did not assert that he 
intended to attend the party, this information is conveyed pragmatically. Of course, the 
distinction between asserted and pragmatically conveyed content is hard to pin down. It might be 
worried that on the relevant notion of assertion we should hold that Max really did assert that he 
planned or intended to attend the party. But this would be a mistake. Consider the following 
modification of PARTY:  
 
NO-INTENTION: Max is talking with an acquaintance, Sally, about where they will be 
in the evening. Max is aware that Tom, a mutual acquaintance, is holding a party. He has 
no desire or intention to attend, indeed he would rather avoid doing so. However, he also 
has very good evidence that he will be forced to attend against his will. As a result, he 
                                                          
12 Interlocutors have reported a range of intuitions from the strong judgement that Max has lied, to the judgement 
that he clearly does not lie, with many (myself included) being able to feel a pull in both directions. This variability in 
intuitions is unlikely to be due to any lack of sophistication (such as the equation of ‘lying’ with ‘stating falsely’, or a 
confusion between judgements regarding whether of not Max has lied and judgements of his general moral 
character), as these were not lay intuitions, they were the intuitions of trained philosophers of language, ethicists, 
epistemologists, and linguists (primarily colleagues and those present at conferences at which earlier versions of this 
paper were presented).  This variability in intuitions is, I believe, data to be explained. There should not be such 
variability if the standard view captures all there is to lying. The approach I develop here is not committed to the 
claim that Max does lie, nor to the claim that he does not. It explains why, if he does lie, some might reach the 
opposite judgement. And vice versa if he does not lie. It is worth noting that, among interlocutors who have written 
on the topic of lying, there was a tendency to judge that Max has lied in all cases. This may simply be due to the fact 
that Max’s having lied is entailed by the majority of views of lying in the literature (including those endorsed by these 
interlocutors). However, I think an alternative (and more charitable) explanation is available. I will return to this 
point in footnote eighteen.  
13 This is not, I hasten to emphasize, to claim that Max did not lie. My aim here is simply to indicate the sort of 
mindset which may be conducive to the intuition that Max did not lie.  
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believes that he will be at Tom’s party in the evening. He asserts “I will be at Tom’s 
party”.  
In asserting without qualification that he will be at Tom’s party he communicates that he has an 
intention to attend. He thus communicates something false. However, he does not lie. All he 
actually asserted was that he would be at the party, not that he intended or planned to attend. The 
situation may be different if he was explicitly asked ‘what are your plans for tonight?’, or if this 
was clearly the question under discussion (see Stokke 2016). However, this is not built into the 
case. It is, thus, important not to let this misleading pragmatically conveyed information distort 
one’s judgment about the case. In CHANGE OF MIND the content of Max’s assertion was true, 
and he went out of his way to make sure of that.14  
So, CHANGE OF MIND is problematic for the standard view. But there is an obvious fall-back: 
As noted in footnote eleven, some theorists hold that lies must be false, or even known to be 
false. Yet Max’s assertion was true. This may explain the hesitancy of some to claim that Max has 
lied in CHANGE OF MIND. However, it leaves open the question of why others have the 
opposite intuition.15 Moreover, CHANGE OF MIND can be modified in such a way that Max’s 
assertion ends up being false. Yet this alteration does not make it any clearer a case of lying:  
ACCIDENT: In general Max is a highly trustworthy and morally upstanding person. 
Deception is out of character for him. Thus, upon telling Sally that he will be at the party 
Max feels terrible. He likes and respects her, and is disturbed by the idea of misleading 
her. Moreover, having said that he would be at the party he now feels a commitment to 
be there. That is, having committed himself to the claim that he will be at the party he 
now feels an obligation to make this claim true. Thus, upon asserting that he will be at the 
party he immediately changes his mind and resolves to attend the party after all. He gets 
ready, sets off to the party, and is hit by a car as he approaches his destination. He dies on 
the scene and never makes it through the door. 
                                                          
14 As one referee suggested, it could simply be that people’s intuitions about CHANGE OF MIND are confused. 
For example, perhaps Max’s change of mind leads some to question whether he really believed that he would not 
attend the party in the first place. Since it is explicitly stated that Max’s plans, when he makes his statement, conflict 
with his statement, this particular explanation does not strike me as promising. I would hope for a more charitable 
explanation of the relevant intuitions. But the point remains that, in general, there may be a number of  viable 
explanations for the conflicting intuitions CHANGE OF MIND seems liable to generate. Some of these 
explanations may be consistent with the standard view. Thus, it is worth emphasizing that even if the testimonial 
worth account can provide a compelling account of these conflicting verdicts (as I will argue it can), this fact by itself 
does not provide particularly strong support for the view that lying involves displaying poor testimonial worth (a 
claim I will argue for in what follows). Thankfully my case for the claim that lying involves displaying poor 
testimonial worth does not depend on these considerations alone. In §2.2 I argue that the testimonial worth account 
is also able to provide a straightforward explanation of the problem raised by selfless assertions and bald faced lies. It 
is the ability of the testimonial worth account to provide a unified account of these separate problems which, I think, 
speaks strongly in its favor.  
15 This assumes that part of the data we must capture when theorising about lying is the pattern of intuitive  
judgements people have about whether or not somebody has lied (this is not to say that a theory must capture all 
such judgements, but if it conflicts with large swathes of such judgements I take this to be a cost).  However, as one 
referee points out, it may be that we should simply expect such widespread disagreement and not consider it a cost if 
a theory is unable to capture it.  
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Once again, Max did everything within his power to ensure that his assertion ended up being 
true. His unexpected demise no more makes him a liar than it would make him a promise breaker 
had he promised to attend the party. Since ACCIDENT is identical to CHANGE OF MIND in 
all relevant respects, except that Max’s assertion ends up being false in ACCIDENT, it is unlikely 
that the intuition that Max did not lie in CHANGE OF MIND is simply driven by the intuition 
that lies must be false. 
Of course, the falsity of Max’s utterance in ACCIDENT is merely accidental. It could perhaps be 
maintained that, in order to have lied, the speaker must be responsible for the falsity of their 
assertion (that is, that the speaker be responsible for having asserted a falsehood). This would 
capture the intuition that Max has not lied in either CHANGE OF MIND or ACCIDENT. 
However, this condition is too strong:16  
ASSASSIN: After telling Sally that he will be at the party Max goes home and settles in 
for a night reading. He would have read through the night if it were not for an assassin 
who enters his living room and shoots him in the head. As a result, he neither reads 
through the night nor goes to the party. 
Max clearly lies in ASSASSIN. Yet the falsity of his assertion is not his own doing. Thus, one’s 
having lied does not require that one’s stating a falsehood was one’s own doing (even if it does 
require that one state a falsehood). So, the intuition that Max has not lied in ACCIDENT and 
CHANGE OF MIND cannot be explained by this more sophisticated version of the falsity view 
either.  
Thus, the hesitancy to claim that Max has lied in CHANGE OF MIND is not due to the falsity 
of his assertion. In order to explain the variable intuitions this case can evoke, I claim, we  should 
recognize that judging a speaker to have lied involves judging them to have displayed poor 
testimonial worth. In SIMPLE LIE Max stated a falsehood, and this was his own doing. 
Likewise, in ASSASSIN, although it was not his own doing that his statement turned out to be 
false, the nexus of motivations, values, and commitments underlying his assertion was the same 
as in SIMPLE LIE. Thus, his character was such that the falsity of his utterance could, in 
relevantly similar circumstances (i.e. in SIMPLE LIE), be a manifestation of this character. 
Moreover, his character remains stable throughout each case. 
In CHANGE OF MIND and ACCIDENT, when we view the cases retrospectively, and 
consider Max’s total pattern of motivations and behaviour, it is easy to feel that he has not lied. 
This is easily explained. It is true that Max had a deceptive intention, believing his statement to be 
false. However, he also feels a strong commitment to truthfulness, and a duty not to mislead. In 
the end, it is these features of his character which win the day. It is these features that eventually 
affect his having spoken the truth in CHANGE OF MIND. Given the situational testimonial 
character exemplified over this duration it required an unlikely stroke of bad luck in ACCIDENT 
                                                          
16 Similarly, the claim that the speaker must know that what they assert is false ends up being too strong. We can 
generate analogues of SIMPLE LIE where the speaker’s belief is unsafe (for example, due to a failed plan to kidnap 
the speaker and bring them to the party), or defeated (due to consistent past failures to follow through on deceptive 
intentions (see footnote 22 for further discussion of such a case)). 
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for his assertion to turn out false. His speaking falsely here was, in no way, a manifestation of his 
character as a testifier. Thus, it is natural that, in judging the case retrospectively, we would feel 
pressure to deny that Max has lied.  
However, the situation changes if we focus on a shorter sub-duration of the case. Consider the 
time slice at which Max produces his assertion: at this precise moment his commitment to 
truthfulness is not dominant in his character. He is, over this short duration, being deceptive. 
Indeed, for the brief duration in question he is displaying similar testimonial character to that 
displayed in SIMPLE LIE. The situational testimonial character displayed over this short 
duration is such that it could, in relevantly similar cases, be manifested by his speaking falsely. 
This explains why, by focusing on the precise moment of assertion, it is so easy to judge that Max 
has lied. His behaviour over this short duration displays poor testimonial worth.  
If there is any fact of the matter about whether or not Max lied in CHANGE OF MIND, then 
either the judgement that he has lied, or the judgement that he has not lied, is false.17 The 
hypothesis that lies display poor testimonial worth allows us to capture the range of judgements 
CHANGE OF MIND elicits without committing either way. It can, for those who hold that Max 
does lie, be seen as providing an error theory for the judgement that he does not, and vice versa 
for those who hold that he has not lied. Moreover, it clearly captures the judgements of those 
who find themselves pulled in both directions.18 Still, there may be other ways to capture these 
variable judgements. So, I do not wish to place too much weight on this argument alone. In §2.2 
                                                          
17 The correctness of either approach will likely come down to whether or not the relevant time span for lying 
assessments is the moment of assertion, or the entire duration of time relevant to the truthfulness of the utterance. 
Of course, it may be that there is no fact of the matter here, or that the concept of lying is context sensitive along 
this dimension.   
18 In footnote twelve I noted that most interlocutors who are already invested in the literature on lying reported the 
intuition that Max lied in all cases. I believe that the preceding remarks can also help us explain why this would be 
the case. It is natural to see the extant literature on lying not as a debate regarding the conditions under which an 
agent has lied, but rather a debate regarding the conditions under which one count as lying. It is clear that, for certain 
types of action F, it can be true that one is Fing at t1, and yet false, at some later time t2, that one successfully Fd. 
Suppose John sets off across the road at t1 with the intention of reaching the other side. It is correct to say of John, 
at t1, that he is/was crossing the road. However, if he gets hit by a car and never makes it across then it will be false 
to claim that he crossed the road. This will not falsify the claim that he was crossing the road. It will be natural to 
state that he got hit by a car whilst crossing the road.  
Similarly, the claim that Max did not lie in CHANGE OF MIND is consistent with the claim that he was lying whilst 
producing his assertion. We can accept that Max was lying whilst holding that it is open whether, in the end, he did 
actually lie. That is, we can think of his change of mind analogously to John’s being hit by a car. The distinction 
between one’s lying and one’s having lied will only ever becomes relevant in cases like CHANGE OF MIND where 
A) the truth or falsity of the relevant assertion is unsettled at the time of assertion, and B) it is within the power of 
the testifier to determine the truth or falsity of their assertion after it has been produced. In all other cases one’s 
engaging in the practice of lying will entail that one has lied. Thus, it is unsurprising that this distinction has been 
overlooked. I believe the tendency of those invested in the literature on lying to view the cases in this way likely 
explains the predominant verdict that Max lied in all cases. This is not, of course, to say that this verdict is mistaken. 
I remain neutral on this issue. But it explains this pattern of judgements in a charitable way, consistently with the 
open hypothesis that Max did not lie in CHANGE OF MIND. 
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I argue that the testimonial worth hypothesis also provides a straightforward solution to the 
puzzle raised by bald faced lies and selfless assertions. This significantly strengthens the case for 
the hypothesis that lies display poor testimonial worth, as it indicates that the hypothesis can 
explain multiple recalcitrant problems in a simple and unified way.  
2.2 The Analysis of Lying 
In §2.1 I argued that, by holding that judgements about whether somebody has lied involve 
judgements of testimonial worth, we are able to account for the variability in intuitions about 
CHANGE OF MIND. This suggests that the conditions set out by the standard view are not 
sufficient for an agent of have lied. For an agent to have lied they must, in addition, display poor 
testimonial worth. In light of this it may be tempting to simply add a testimonial worth condition 
onto the standard definition of lying. However, caution is called for: as noted in footnote ten, the 
intention to deceive condition is controversial. Many theorists dispense of this condition, holding 
that a lie is simply an assertion of a proposition the speaker believes to be false. Proposing a 
complete analysis of lying requires taking a stand on this issue. Consideration of the reasons for 
and against the deception condition on lying provides further support for the hypothesis that lies 
display poor testimonial worth.  
The main reason for rejecting the intention to deceive condition is the existence of lies which are 
not intended to deceive (or ‘bald faced lies’). Consider the following example (cf. Fallis, 2009, p 
34.): 
MOBSTER: The police have inadmissible evidence that Tony, a mob boss, killed their 
witness. As they interview him they show him the evidence, proving to him, and everyone 
else in the room, that they know he did it. Still, Tony might tell them “You have got the 
wrong guy, I didn’t do it”, as he knows their evidence is inadmissible.  
It seems clear that Tony has lied. Yet it seems equally clear that he does not intend to deceive his 
audience. He knows nobody is going to be persuaded. Indeed, he knows that his utterance will 
not even decrease anybody’s credence that he is the murderer. In light of such cases it seems clear 
that intent to deceive cannot be necessary for lying.19  
Unfortunately, as Lackey (2013) points out, we do not acquire an adequate account of lying 
simply by removing the intention to deceive condition from the standard definition. Doing so 
forces us to misclassify certain intuitively acceptable assertions as lies. She provides the following 
example, taken from her (2007):  
CREATIONIST TEACHER: Stella is a devoutly Christian fourth-grade teacher, and her 
religious beliefs are grounded in a personal relationship with God that she takes herself to 
                                                          
19 Keiser (2016) holds that, despite all appearances, Tony has not lied, as he has not really asserted. He has, according 
to Keiser, not provided a reason to believe that he did not commit the crime. It is, for Keiser, impossible to assert 
something one does not believe without intending to deceive. I will put this contention to one side as, to me, Tony’s 
utterance seems as clear a case of an assertion (and a lie) as any. Keiser argues that alternative conceptions of 
assertion incorrectly count cases of metaphor as lies. However, as Stokke (2017) shows, this is not the case. 
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have had since she was a very young child. This relationship grounds her belief in the 
truth of creationism and, accordingly, a belief in the falsity of evolutionary theory. Despite 
this, Stella fully recognizes that there is an overwhelming amount of scientific evidence 
against both of these beliefs. Indeed, she readily admits that she is not basing her own 
commitment to creationism on evidence at all but, rather, on the personal faith that she 
has in an all-powerful Creator. Because of this, Stella thinks that her religious beliefs are 
irrelevant to her duties as a teacher; accordingly, she regards her obligation as a teacher to 
include presenting material that is best supported by the available evidence, which clearly 
includes the truth of evolutionary theory. As a result, while presenting her biology lesson 
today, Stella asserts to her students, ‘Modern day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo 
erectus’, though she herself does not believe this proposition.  
Lackey, 2013, 243. 
It seems clear that Stella has not lied to her class.20 Yet she has asserted something she believes to 
be false. Thus, merely asserting something one believes to be false is not sufficient for lying. This 
generates a puzzle: we seemingly need a deception condition to avoid claiming that Stella lied. 
Yet, we cannot endorse a deception condition if we are to count Tony as having lied.21  
The testimonial worth condition provides us with a way to resolve this puzzle. Lackey is correct 
that asserting something one believes to be false is not sufficient for one’s having lied. However, 
this does not necessitate a deceptiveness condition. The difference between CREATIONIST 
TEACHER and MOBSTER resides in the differing testimonial worth displayed by Stella and 
Tony. It is clear that Tony displays poor testimonial worth. His assertion is false, and his having 
asserted a falsehood manifests his disregard for the truth. That is, the truth does not, for Tony, 
factor into whether or not he should make his statement. He asserts that he didn’t commit the 
crime whilst fully believing that this is false. His speaking falsely is, thus, his own doing. Stella, on 
the other hand, does not display poor testimonial worth. It is true that she fails to believe what 
she asserts. Thus she, like Tony, also displays disregard for the truth. However, unlike Tony, this 
disregard for the truth is compensated for by another operative character trait. That is, she is 
committed to teaching her students whatever is best supported by the scientific evidence. As a 
                                                          
20 This judgment is not entirely uncontroversial, but it is close. Fallis (2014), although he acknowledges that he shares 
the intuition that Stella did not lie, questions the reliability of intuitions about CREATIONIST TEACHER. 
Nonetheless, he does, in the end, seek to accommodate the intuition that Stella did not lie. As Lackey (2013) notes, 
the case can be constructed in such a way as to elicit the judgement that Stella has lied. If Stella simply teaches 
evolution because it is on the syllabus, whilst actively concealing the fact that she believes it to be false then it is easy 
to feel that she has lied. This is captured both by Lackey’s deceptionist account of lying, and the non-deceptionist 
account presented here: If she is only evidence responsive because she is instructed to be evidence responsive by the 
schoolboard then it is incidental to her character as a testifier. It also seems plausible that in all versions of the case 
Stella is, in some sense, insincere regardless of her underlying motivations. But this is beside the point with respect to 
whether or not she has lied. 
21 Lackey’s own solution to this puzzle is to propose that lies must be deceptive in a broader sense, whereby one 
counts as deceptive if one has intentionally concealed information or evidence. I am not convinced that this 
approach is able to predict that Tony has lied, as he is not really concealing anything with his utterance. Nor is he 
withholding evidence, as any confession which he could potentially give does not yet exist to be withheld. For a 
more extensive response along these lines see Fallis (2014).  
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result, were her assertion to have been false this would not have manifested her lack of 
commitment to the truth, or poor character. As long as she maintains her evidence sensitivity, her 
disregard for the truth could not, in any normal way, cause or explain her having spoken falsely. 
For her to have spoken falsely the evidence for the truth of evolutionary theory must have been 
highly misleading. So, unlike Tony, her testimonial character taken as a whole (i.e. the web of 
commitments and values underlying her assertion, including both her disregard for the truth and 
her commitment to evidence sensitivity) could not be manifested in her speaking falsely. Were 
she to have spoken falsely this would have been a matter of bad luck, not her own doing. Thus, 
unlike Tony, her assertion does not display poor testimonial worth.22 
By embracing the testimonial worth condition on lying we can reject the deception condition. 
This suggests the following simple analysis of lying: One lies iff one displays poor testimonial 
worth by asserting something one believes to be false.2324 This analysis, which places testimonial 
worth at the centre of our practice of negatively appraising acts of assertion, explains multiple 
recalcitrant problems in a simple and unified way. The testimonial worth condition would be 
falsified by a case with either of the following features:   
A) An agent displays poor testimonial worth by stating something they believe to be false, 
but does not lie.  
B) An agent lies by stating something they believe to be false, but does not display poor 
testimonial worth.  
An (A) case would have the following features:  
1. The speaker asserts something they believe to be false.  
2. In doing so, they display some character trait which could be manifested in their 
speaking falsely (such as disregard for the truth), 
3. They display no compensating character trait which would, in normal circumstances, 
result in them speaking the truth (such as sensitivity to evidence). 
                                                          
22  Mine is not the only response to this puzzle. Fallis (2014) notes that the non-deception theorist could simply add a 
requirement that a liar cannot believe that the evidence supports the truth of their assertion. I worry that this view is 
open to counter example. We could, for example, construct a version of SIMPLE LIE in which Max has been in the 
same situation many times in the past, and has always had a change of heart. In this situation, despite his current 
intention not to go to the party, he may have overwhelming evidence that, if he says he will go, then he will go. And 
he may be aware of this. Nonetheless, when he says that he will be at the party, fully intending to avoid going (and, 
this time, following through on his intention) he clearly lies. 
23 The proposed view can easily be modified with the disbelief requirement replaced by an expected epistemic 
damage condition along the lines of Krauss (2017), or a higher credence in falsity than truth requirement along the 
lines of Marsili (2014).  
24 Lackey also objects that rejecting the deception condition on lies removes our ability to explain the prima facie 
wrongness of lying. I am not convinced that there is a general moral prohibition against lying. However, the 
testimonial worth account does allow us to account for the related fact that judging somebody to have lied involves 
assessing them negatively as an agent. This may go some way toward explaining why many find it intuitive that lying 
is prima facie wrong. 
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4. The agent intuitively does not lie.  
In a case where only (1), (2), and (4) were satisfied, but not (3), the testimonial worth account 
predicts that the agent will not have lied. This is because, although the speaker displays some 
character trait which would, ceterus paribus, result in their speaking falsely, they also display a 
compensating trait of character which, even in combination with the aforementioned negative 
trait would, under normal conditions, result in them speaking the truth.  Thus, the total web of 
motivations and commitments underlying their assertion could not be manifested in their 
speaking falsely. CREATIONIST TEACHER fits this structure.  
A (B) case would have the following features:  
1. A speaker asserts something they believe to be false. 
2. The agent intuitively does lie. 
3. Given the character the agent displays when asserting it is a mere coincidence that they 
end up speaking falsely. 
(3) will be satisfied only if the speaker fails to display any traits of character which could be 
manifested in their speaking falsely, or displays such traits in combination with some 
compensating traits which are not themselves overridden. I am doubtful that any such cases can 
be given, but only time will tell. This concludes my discussion of lying. In the next section I will 
argue that judgements of testimonial worth also play a central role in our acceptance of 
testimony.  
3. Testimony and Testimonial Worth. 
The acceptance of testimony normally involves the taking of a speaker at their word. It involves 
trust in the speaker: a recognition of the speaker’s agency, and the fact that they are responsible 
for the truthfulness of their assertion. This seems to distinguish testimony from other sources of 
knowledge. When we form beliefs by accepting the deliverances of instruments, for example, we 
treat them as mere truth gauges. When we take a speaker at their word we do not simply treat 
them as a truth gauge. We accept their testimony as a deliverance of their free agency.  
To get clear on this, it will be helpful to consider a pair of cases. Consider the following versions 
of Jennifer Lackey’s consistent liar case (cf. Lackey (2008), pp 53-54):  
LIAR: As a teenager Bertha suffered a brain lesion which causes her to constantly lie 
about whether or not she has seen a particular animal. She undergoes surgery to treat the 
injury. However, it is found that the lesion cannot be removed. So, instead of removing it 
the surgeon modifies the lesion, and creates a second, so that her lies become incredibly 
consistent, and pattern exactly with a newly introduced perceptual unreliability. The result 
is that whenever Bertha intends to lie about seeing an animal she ends up stating a truth.  
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LIAR 1: The surgeon lies to Bertha’s parents and tells them that he has removed the 
lesion. When Bertha makes statements about animals her parents accept her testimony by 
taking her at her word, the same way they would any other informant. 
LIAR 2: The surgeon informs Bertha’s parents about the procedure. Now, whenever 
Bertha says she has seen a particular animal, her parents come to believe that she has seen 
the animal. However, they do not, in so doing, take her at her word. They do not believe 
her. Rather, they simply take her to be a reliable indicator of the facts.  
Some theorists have made much of this distinction. For example, assurance theorists have taken 
such considerations to require the introduction of distinctive epistemic resources not found in 
accounts of knowledge from other sources (such as perception). Assurance theorists emphasize 
that, in testifying, speakers make themselves responsible for the truth of their assertions. In 
particular, speakers make themselves accountable for the truth of their assertions. They open 
themselves to sanction if what they say turns out to be false. Accepting a speaker’s testimony, for 
the assurance theorist, involves accepting the speaker’s offer to be accountable for the truth of 
one’s belief. The reason one gains is thus not evidential. It is second personal.25  
Assurance theories can be placed within a wider category of theories which combine an emphasis 
on the role of trust in testimonial belief formation, with the view that trust involves engagement 
from within the participant stance (that is, the view that, if one trusts, and one’s trust is betrayed, 
then one is prepared to, and within one’s rights to bear certain negative reactive attitudes toward 
the violator of one’s trust).26 Such views are attractive since it seems clear that taking a speaker at 
their word, as opposed to treating them as a mere truth gauge, involves accepting their testimony 
on trust. Moreover, there are compelling reasons to hold that trust, often at least, involves such 
second personal relationships. This seems to be what separates trust from mere reliance. If we 
trust somebody, we do feel resentment when that trust is violated, and we typically expect our 
trust to constitute a reason for the trusted to be trustworthy.  
Assurance theories face a number of problems. One of these problems generalizes to all views 
which combine an emphasis on trust with a second personal approach to trust.27 This line of 
critique has been pressed by Owens (2006), who questions whether the acceptance of testimony, 
even when we take the speaker at their word, always involves a recognition of their accountability 
for the truth of their assertion. If Owens’s challenge is successful, this leaves us with a problem: 
how are we to account for the distinctive attitude we take toward speakers when we accept their 
testimony as a deliverance of their free agency? 
Owens asks us to consider how we might treat a diary which was intended by the author to be 
kept private. The author of such a diary cannot be seen as having any audience directed 
intentions. They do not make themselves accountable for the content of their diary. The diary is, 
                                                          
25 See Ross (1986), Hinchman (2005, 2014), and Moran (2005) for statements of the assurance view.  
26 Prominent examples of such views of trust include Holton (1994) Hieronymi (2008), Hawley (2014), Darwall 
(2017), and Marušić (2017).  
27 See Darwall (2006), Lackey (2008), Schmitt (2010), Leonard (2016), and Shieber (2016) for alternative criticisms of 
assurance views.  
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after all private. They should not face sanction if the claims therein turn out to be false. However, 
it still seems that we can take the diarist at their word. We can accept their testimony in the same 
way we would accept anybody else’s testimony, without treating them as a mere truth gauge. A 
similar point applies to eavesdroppers. If one overhears A telling B that p then, even though one 
is not the intended target of A’s telling, one can nonetheless take A at his word. However, one 
would not, in such a situation, be within one’s rights to hold A accountable for the truth of one’s 
belief. Only B gains this right. So, it is a mistake to claim that taking a speaker at their word 
involves accepting their offer to be accountable for the truth of one’s belief. That is, taking a 
speaker at their word does not always involve the attitude of trust, where this is thought of as a 
distinctly second personal attitude.2829 
However, if taking a speaker at their word does not involve such second personal trust, then it is 
not clear in what sense it involves the recognition of the speaker’s responsibility for the truth of 
their assertion. It is not clear in what sense it involves the treatment of testimony as a deliverance 
of the speaker’s free agency, or what separates the acceptance of testimony from that of the 
deliverances of instruments. Owens has his own response to this problem. He argues that sincere 
testimony involves the intentional expression of belief. When we accept testimony by taking a 
speaker at their word we take them to be intentionally expressing their belief. Such intentional 
expressions of belief, Owens maintains, reflect the rationality of the belief expressed, as do beliefs 
formed on the basis of such testimony. This serves to distinguish testimonial from instrumental 
knowledge. Testimony involves a reliance on the rationality of the speaker. 
Unfortunately, Owens’s account also fails to cover the full range of cases.30 To see this, let us 
turn our attention back to CREATIONIST TEACHER. Stella does not believe in evolution. 
Thus, she is not expressing a belief when she asserts that Homo sapiens evolved from Homo 
erectus. Yet, her audience can still come to know, by accepting her testimony, that Homo sapiens 
                                                          
28 Of course, there are different notions of trust in common use. I believe there is also a sense of “trusting a speaker”  
which involves judging the speaker to be being truthful and, in so doing, displaying positive testimonial worth.  
29 McMyler (2013) responds to Owens, holding that eavesdroppers do not simply take speakers at their word. He 
motivates this verdict by pointing out that eavesdroppers do not accept an offer of assurance, and are not in a 
position to defer responsibility for their belief to the speaker. It is not clear why this objection would have any force 
for anyone who does not antecedently accept the assurance theorist’s view of what it is to take a speaker at their 
word. After all, it certainly seems as if one can, whilst eavesdropping, take a speaker at their word. That is, one’s 
attitude toward the speaker can be far closer to that of Bertha’s parents in LIAR 1 than LIAR 2. Indeed, it is not 
even clear that there is a clean distinction between eavesdropper and non-eavesdropper cases. We could construct a 
series ranging from cases in which it is clear that A is eavesdropping, to cases in which A is clearly addressed (cases 
where, for example, their presence becomes increasingly obvious to the speaker). Denial that eavesdropper cases 
ever involve the taking of a speaker at their word would require us to maintain that, at some point in this series, there 
is a cutoff point at which the agent’s method of belief formation radically shifts. This is implausible. Thus, McMyler’s 
challenge is not persuasive. This is not to say that there are no cases in which, in taking a speaker’s word for it, we 
accept an offer of assurance. It may even be correct that such cases involve a distinctive species of warrant. It is 
merely to say that taking a speaker at their word, as opposed to treating them as a mere indicator of the truth, does 
not require accepting such an offer of assurance. 
30
 This is not the only problem Owens faces. He advocates a transmission view of testimony, and such views are 
problematic in several ways (see Lackey (1999), MacFarlane (2005), Barnett (2015), Fraser (2016), Peet (2016), 
Leonard (2018), and Peet and Pitcovski (2018)). 
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evolved from Homo erectus. Now, as presented, CREATIONIST TEACHER can plausibly be 
taken as a case of knowledge from falsehood. That is, in at least some versions of the case Stella’s 
students will take her to be expressing a belief, and this will form part of the basis for their 
testimonial belief. However, the case can be reconstructed without this feature. 
Suppose that Stella’s students are aware of her dedication to their education. They have seen her 
tirelessly researching the topics she teaches. They have had challenging and engaging discussions 
with her in which she has illuminatingly explained subjects they were struggling to understand. 
And they have overheard other teachers praise her unwavering commitment to education. 
However, they also know that she is deeply religious, and that she belongs to a church which 
preaches creationism. The students may have no idea whether or not Stella actually believes in 
evolution. However, they have faith in her as a dedicated educator and a rational appraiser of 
evidence (if not a reliable and rational believer). They know that they are in safe hands. So, when 
Stella asserts “Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus” they simply take her at her word. 
They do not, in doing so, assume that she is expressing a belief. Thus, Owens’s account also fails 
to capture what it is to take a speaker at their word.31  
What, then, is involved in taking a speaker at their word? It doesn’t seem to require that the 
audience enter into any second personal relationship with the speaker, and it doesn’t seem to 
require a judgement that the speaker is intentionally expressing a belief. Yet it does seem to 
involve a recognition of the speaker’s responsibility for the truth of what they assert. I propose 
that, in taking a speaker at their word, we take them to be displaying positive testimonial worth. 
That is, we take them to be asserting the truth, and we take their truthfulness to be a 
manifestation of their character as a testifier.32 This captures the insight that, in taking a speaker 
at their word, we accept their testimony as a deliverance of their free agency; something they are 
responsible for. However, it captures this not in terms of responsibility as accountability, but 
rather responsibility as attributability. It also captures the appeal of Owens’s view: if one is a 
responsible belief former then, in intentionally expressing one’s beliefs, one displays positive 
testimonial worth. However, it also enables us to capture cases such as modified CREATIONIST 
TEACHER. Finally, it is clear on this view what separates the attitude of Bertha’s parents in 
LIAR 1 and LIAR 2. In LIAR 1, but not LIAR 2, not only do they take her utterances to be 
truthful, but they take the truthfulness to be a manifestation of her character as a testifier. In 
LIAR 2 they know that, although her utterances are truthful, this truthfulness is not attributable 
to Bertha. 
                                                          
31 It could be maintained that the students do not take Stella at her word. Perhaps they treat her as a mere truth 
gauge. However, it is not clear why we should think this. The experience of believing Stella may, for the students, be 
no different to that of believing anybody else. The attitude of the students toward Stella’s testimony seems far closer 
to that of Bertha’s parents in LIAR 1 than LIAR 2.  
 
32 To be clear, I am not suggesting that displaying positive testimonial worth entails truth telling, or even that judging 
somebody to be displaying positive testimonial worth entails judging that they are telling the truth. After all, as I 
noted earlier, one can display positive testimonial worth whilst speaking falsely. Rather, the idea is that taking 
somebody to be telling the truth is not sufficient for taking them at their word. In order to take somebody at their 
word we must, in addition, take their truthfulness to be a manifestation of their character as a testifier. That is, we 
must take their truthfulness to be non-accidental given their character.   
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4. Conclusion 
Our normative appraisals go beyond mere judgements of norm conformity. Our judgements of 
moral responsibility, both interpersonal and aretaic, are central to our interactions with others. 
Our assessments of agents as testifiers likewise shape our interactions with them. Thus, it is 
unsurprising that such assessments, like our moral assessments, come in interpersonal and aretaic 
forms. A great deal of emphasis has been placed on the interpersonal dimension of our 
assessments of testimony. I have argued here, however, that aretaic assessment is central to our 
appraisals of testimony. Our most damning normative assessment of speech, the judgement that 
an agent has lied, is an aretaic assessment. And, in taking a speaker at their word, we judge not 
only that their utterance is true, but that its truthfulness is a manifestation of the speaker’s 
character as a testifier.  
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